Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 
This treaty was written when there was concern of communist expansion into South East Asia and beyond. In 1986, New Zealand's membership of this treaty was suspended by the United States due to incompatible positions regarding nuclear weapons: New Zealand declared itself nuclear free, and the United States would neither confirm nor deny if any of its ships visiting New Zealand were nuclear-powered or nuclear capable. Over the last 20 years, the two countries have managed to work around their differences to foster a close defense relationship. This Strategy Research Project examines the current defense relationship between New Zealand and the United States and offers suggestions for the way forward. The paper concludes that the 'NZ' cannot be put back into ANZUS, nor does it matter. First, the treaty is no longer relevant and serves no purpose in the 21 st century. Second, the nuclear debate is irreconcilable and should not be the central issue in the defense relationship. What does matter is how New Zealand and the United States can progress their defense relationship as they navigate their way through the complex international environment.
PUTTING THE 'NZ' BACK INTO ANZUS: DOES IT MATTER?
The time has come to part. We part as friends, but we part.
-George P. Shultz US Secretary of State 1 It was with these words that the United States signaled to the Prime Minister of New Zealand that its patience had run out. 2 New Zealand was suspended from the Australia New Zealand United States (ANZUS) Treaty by the United States (US), and the political relationship between the two countries was at an all-time low. A lot has occurred over the last 21 years: The cold war has ended, the United States has confirmed itself as the sole super-power, and the events of 9/11 have resulted in a so-
called Global War on Terror (GWOT). During this time, New Zealand and the United
States have managed to work around the suspension of the ANZUS Treaty to develop a cooperative defense relationship. However, despite this, there has been no formal progress on the ANZUS Treaty, and New Zealand remains officially suspended from the alliance.
Much has been written about causes of the rift and many authors have offered opinions as to how the 'NZ' can be put back into ANZUS. 3 However, most literature on this subject has been retrospective and has not taken into account the strategic environment that now exists. It is therefore the aim of this research paper to examine the current defense relationship between the United States and New Zealand and to offer some suggestions for the way forward. This will be achieved by first providing some context to the debate by looking at the history of the treaty and the developments over the last 21 years. Next, the key issues will be examined from the perspectives of both New Zealand and the United States. Finally, the paper will conclude with an assessment of what needs to be done to progress the defense relationship further.
It is the thesis of this paper that the 'NZ' cannot be put back into ANZUS, nor does it matter. It does not matter for two reasons. First, the treaty is no longer relevant and serves no purpose in the 21 st century. Second, the nuclear debate is irreconcilable and
should not be the central issue in the defense relationship. What does matter is how New Zealand and the United States can progress their defense relationship as they navigate their way through the complex international environment.
A Brief History
As mentioned above, it is not the aim of the author to dwell on the past. However, in order to provide context for the reader, it is important to understand how the ANZUS Treaty came to be, what actually caused the rift, and what has occurred in the 21 years since New Zealand was suspended.
In 1950, the strategic attention of New Zealand and the United States was focused on North East Asia, Japan, and Korea. 4 Each nation was concerned about communist expansion into South East Asia and the onset of the cold war. In addition, New Zealand sought a security guarantee to deal with the possibility of a resurgent Japan. 5 After a series of negotiations between Australia, the United States, and New Zealand, the ANZUS Treaty was signed in San Francisco on 1 September 1951. This was an extremely important milestone in New Zealand international relations because it was the first time that New Zealand had signed a treaty with a foreign power without the participation of the United Kingdom. In many ways, it was New Zealand's first venture into global politics without the cocoon of the British Empire. Despite these foreign policy initiatives being adopted by the then current New
Zealand government, the nuclear issue now has strong bipartisan support in New
Zealand politics, and each of the major parties realizes that any attempt to repeal antinuclear legislation will not be accepted by the voting public. It is therefore an issue that is unlikely to be changed, irrespective of which political party is in power. Likewise, it is improbable that the United States will change its neither confirm nor deny policy. The net result of these positions is a stalemate that has hampered progress on formal defense relations for more than two decades.
So where does all this leave the security relationship now? Whereas the 1990s could best be described as a thawing of the relationship, the first seven years of the new century could be described as a warming of the relationship. In the post 9/11 environment, the United States has been very keen to obtain coalition partners for the war on terror as well as for other mutual security concerns. In this regard, New Zealand has provided a number of Special Air Service (SAS) contributions to Operation Enduring With an understanding of what has gone before, the issues that might move the relationship forward can now be examined. As it was then, and as it is appropriate now, the relationship is best viewed through the lens of each country.
New Zealand Perspective
From a New Zealand perspective, the relationship is best viewed in terms of the effects of the punitive measures outlined in NSDD193. United States does reserve the option to change priority on orders for high demand items such as Kevlar body armor. However, this is done according to the operational need rather than on the basis of which country is submitting the order. Over half of the NZDF's major assets are United States-sourced, including all of its key air assets. 26 It is therefore assessed that New Zealand's suspension from ANZUS has had no impact on its ability to access military equipment from the United States.
The final area that warrants attention from a New Zealand perspective is the Free Trade Agreement. This is very important as the United States is the second largest destination of New Zealand exports. Officially, the pursuit of such an agreement should be separate from a security relationship although it is reasonable to envision how they can be linked. New Zealand is not on the list of approved countries to obtain an FTA, and it is understood that this will be revisited by the Trade Promotion Authority in March
2008
. 27 In comparison, Australia has recently achieved an FTA with the United States.
This bid was officially fast-tracked and may have been supported due to Australia's status as a staunch ally. It is therefore assessed that it might be easier for New Zealand to obtain an FTA if it were still an ally of the United States. However, at the working level it is felt that the total value of trade between the two countries is low compared to larger-trading nations, and this is probably the key obstacle that would need to be addressed before an FTA could become a reality. 28 United States Perspective
From a United States perspective, the relationship is best viewed in terms of the extent to which New Zealand is able to assist the United States in pursuing its security interests. The Global War on Terror, South Pacific security, third-party negotiations, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and military exercises are key factors.
At both the political and military levels, the United States clearly understands the anomalies that exist with respect to the defense relationship between the two countries.
Despite the nuclear issue and restraints of NSDD193, the relationship appears to be as close as it has been in decades. In his submission to the United States Senate, the Finally, the issue of New Zealand not participating in military exercises with the United States continues to be problematic and could be described as the last piece in the mosaic required in order to fully restore defense relations. 38 Here the initiative still Zealand's anti-nuclear policy? 40 The convergence of interests brought about by the GWOT, PSI, and economics suggests that the answer is yes.
In reality, it is not that simple for the United States to welcome New Zealand back with open arms. At the political and diplomatic level, New Zealand cannot be seen as "getting away with it." This could create a precedent for other like-minded nations to follow. For example, Japan has a nuclear-free policy, but has found ways to accommodate US Navy ships without forcing the neither confirm nor deny issue. It is perhaps in the best interest of the United States to maintain good military relations with New Zealand, while still reserving the right to default to NSDD193. After all, NSDD193
still remains extant United States policy unless formally overturned.
Assessment and Options
Now that the issues of both countries have been addressed, it is appropriate to review the situation and to examine options for the way ahead. Quite clearly, the relationship between the two countries demonstrates that there are more interests shared than there are differences. In the last few years, there has been an increased The one significant difference that does exist, relates to the nuclear issue. As already mentioned in this paper, this issue is considered irreconcilable and prevents New Zealand from being reinstated back into ANZUS as a full alliance partner.
Accordingly, this leaves two broad options for the way ahead: either preserve the status quo or take steps to formalize a bilateral United States and New Zealand relationship that would replace the ANZUS Treaty. These options are discussed below.
Status Quo
From a New Zealand perspective, continuing with the status quo has many benefits, but is certainly not a "do-nothing" option. The trend over the last 20 years of warming relations needs to continue and the onus will remain on New Zealand to work at the relationship. This is because, in the current circumstances, New Zealand has the most to gain. Furthermore, New Zealand would need to continue to seek opportunities to work with the United States military and to demonstrate that it can be a reliable coalition partner. The key advantage to this approach is that it could strengthen the relationship further and could be viewed as the next logical step in the current relationship. In addition, there is the benefit of putting the nuclear issue to bed once and for all. If each country were able to formally agree over its differences and move on to a formal defense agreement, then there could conceivably be no further barriers to prevent progress in the future.
There are a number of drawbacks in pursuing this course of action. First, what is there to be gained from forming a new defense relationship that cannot be achieved in the current circumstances? There is also a real practical issue of trying to implement it.
New Zealand would need to be formally expelled from ANZUS prior to a new bilateral agreement being signed, and these changes would require formal staffing through to the United States Congress. This would also leave Australia in a position of having to reformulate its policy arrangements with the United States. Another disadvantage with this approach relates to feasibility. If this option were to be adopted, then the United
States would be sending the message that it is happy to have formal defense relations with a country that will not guarantee United States naval forces port access nor transit rights through its territorial waters. This course of action therefore provides the United
States with little to gain and a lot to lose.
A Way Ahead
On balance, the status quo option has the most chance of success and prosperity in the future. It does have the drawback of having to work around the nuclear policy difference; however, this is considered much more workable than trying to formalize an alternative arrangement. Each nation fully understands that the nuclear issue precludes a formal alliance and the status of the current relationship demonstrates that each country can work beyond this single issue. There is also some common ground that can be found between the United States-led PSI and New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance.
The option exists for the United States to declare respect for New Zealand's nuclear position and to explain how this contributes to the aim of reducing the illegal shipments of WMD. Such a policy statement would be a tacit acknowledgment that each country agrees to disagree and can still work together to achieve common objectives. 43 However, New Zealand needs to be mindful not to push too hard in the relationship: It must recognize that the United States has to manage the contradiction between its
declaratory policy and what is happening in reality.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is clear that the NZDF has not suffered greatly due to the restrictions placed upon it by NSDD193. It can be argued that the lack of exercising and training with the United States has had little impact on the NZDF capability. Likewise, the interoperability forum and FMS programs have remained open and there has been increased intelligence sharing in the post 9/11 environment. In many regards, the NZDF is more capable today than it has been in the last 30 years. 44 There have been some political rough spots over the years, and most recently one There is a note of caution. New Zealand is unable to conduct and sustain significant military operations independently and therefore requires robust defense relations. It has such a relationship with Australia, but less so with the United States. 46 It is therefore in New Zealand's interest to keep working at the relationship and to promote the NZDF as a modern and capable force able to play its part in the contemporary strategic environment.
It is the strong feeling of the author that if things continue as they are at present, then there is every reason to suggest that the relationship will continue to improve despite the disagreement over one policy issue. The relationship has matured greatly over the last 20 years since Secretary Shultz made his comments about New Zealand and the United States having to part. Due to a common values system, shared interests, and mutual respect, the two countries have been drawn closer together than they have been in a long time.
In some respects, the relationship can be described as water negotiating rocks in a stream. Each country may approach problems in a different manner, but each is traveling in the same direction. It is therefore concluded that the 'NZ' cannot be put back into ANZUS, nor does it matter. What is more important, is that New Zealand and the United States continue to develop their relationship to work together as they navigate their way through the complex international environment of the 21 st century.
Endnotes 1 Comments made in Manila July 1986, while George Shultz was Secretary of State.
